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1. Introduction: environmental homogenization? 
 
While directly after the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development the 
comments of environmental scholars, officials and interest groups on the successes of this summit 
were rather ambivalent, a decade later we can witness a much more positive evaluation. The 
UNCED conference is nowadays generally perceived as a major breakthrough in putting 
environmental protection and sustainable development forcefully on the (inter)national agendas. 
More specifically, two major contributions of the UNCED are widely celebrated. First, attention 
for international and global environmental problems and policies were strongly triggered by the 
preparations, the summit itself and the aftermath. This resulted, among others, in institutional 
innovations such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
Biodiversity Convention. Secondly, the UNCED meant a major acceleration in the attention paid 
to environmental protection and sustainable development in developing countries. While in most 
industrialized countries the institutionalization of the environment in national politics and policies 
started in the late 1960/early 1970s, in most developing countries the late 1980s and the early 
1990s were the key period for this process of environmental institutionalization.  
The process of institutionalization of the environment in western - and especially, but not only, 
European - industrialized societies has been reflected and theorized upon by social scientists 
especially under the heading of ecological modernization. Ecological modernization refers to a 
restructuring of modern institutions following environmental interests, perspectives and 
rationalities. Less and less the developments in and of modern cultural, political and even 
economic institutions in these western societies can be understood if we exclude environmental 
logics and perspectives. In addition, ideas of ecological modernization were used by policy-
makers and applied social scientists as a perspective for a likely or even desirable route in solving 
longstanding environmental disputes and conflicts. It formed an alternative for both the curative 
end-of-pipe approaches of western nation-states, the demodernization and deindustrialization 
ideologies of the environmental movement, and the postmodernity discourse that deconstructs any 
environmental crisis so that it melts into the air. In that sense ecological modernization is a more 
specific interpretation of the key ideas prevailing in the more general notion of sustainable 
development (Spaargaren and Mol, 1992). 
One of the key questions put on the research agenda of ecological modernization already in 
1995 is its geographical scope. To what extend are ideas of ecological modernization of any use 
in developing or industrializing countries outside Europe? While originally formulated primarily 
in theoretical terms and being subject of theoretical debates in sociological and political science 
literature, this question is of course also of major practical relevance. It involves then policy-
relevant issues of transfer of (ecological modernization inspired) environmental strategies and 
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models of environmental governance from OECD countries to new industrializing economies. It 
also touches upon questions of harmonization or heterogenization and differentiation in 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs): should the numerous MEAs currently being 
concluded and implemented under strong influence of western OECD countries be expected to 
work equally in all countries around the world? Or does the  western bias in MEAs’ policy 
principles, approaches, strategies and inherent state-market-civil society relations prevent their 
equal successful implementation in, for instance, Asian newly industrializing countries? 
Initially, until at least the mid 1990s, ecological modernization was typically seen as a western 
theory, only valid for the limited geographical scope from which it originated. This started to 
change, however, due to two major developments. First, a number of developing countries, 
especially in Southeast and East Asia started to industrialize and arguably to modernize, rapidly. 
The so-called first generation Asian tigers such as Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, were soon 
followed by a second generation new industrializing economies, among which Malaysia, 
Thailand, China and recently Vietnam. With this industrialization and modernization process it 
was believed that it was less easy to conclude that ideas of ecological modernization were ill-
fitting for these nation-states in several or all of its major assumptions (cf. Sonnenfeld, 2000; 
Frijns et al. 2000). Second, the accelerating processes of globalization emerged forcefully on the 
research agenda of the social sciences from the first half of the 1990s onwards. While there was - 
and to some extent still is - considerable disagreement among social scientists on the nature, the 
impact and the evaluation of globalization processes, most scholars do agree that these 
developments strongly contributed to the increasing global interdependence in political, cultural 
and economic domains. For environmental governance and reform it meant that economic, 
political and societal processes and dynamics pushing towards environmental reform often did no 
longer remain restricted to one (often western) country, but spread on the wings of globalization 
to other sides of the globe. A global civil society, global environmental governance and 
environmental management systems operated by transnational corporations settling down in 
developed and developing countries are often referred to as key examples of this. As OECD 
countries arguably dominate globalization processes they might do so also in the environmental 
arena, resulting in the ‘export’ of not only economic and political institutions and mechanisms 
from these countries to elsewhere, but also of environmental reform models, practices and 
dynamics. Hence, to put it in ecological modernization terms, these two developments contributed 
to the spreading of both the conditions under which ecological modernization initially originated 
and their environmental strategies, practices and measures beyond the western nation-states. 
In an earlier publication I have balanced and criticized the view or idea that globalization will 
result automatically in environmental homogenization (Mol, 2001). Next to globalization 
dynamics and processes, the specific local conditions, national priorities, domestic historical 
trajectories, state-market relations and power balances, among others, will equally determine the 
environmental governance and reform practices and institutions. To put it in the terminology of 
Castells (1996/1997): the ‘space of flows’ has to meet somewhere the ‘space of places’, and at 
these meeting points we can expect to witness various models of environmental reform, if any 
substantial environmental reform can be identified at all. If we are to apply the idea of ecological 
modernization outside Western Europe, we might expect to find environmental reform models 
that resemble some of the core features of the (western) idea of ecological modernization, but 
they will also be colored by the specific local conditions and the positions in the world-system (cf. 
Sonnenfeld, 2000). We might conceptualize this with the notion of modes or styles of ecological 
modernization. 
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In applying this to China we touch upon the central questions of this paper: can the 
environmental reforms in contemporary China be interpreted as ecological modernization, what 
are its core features and what are the similarities and differences between Chinese and European 
modes or styles of ecological modernization? This article continues with a summary of the basic 
ideas of ecological modernization as originally formulated. It then briefly reviews the historical 
development of environmental protection in China, especially focusing on urban and industrial 
settings. Subsequently, it investigates the main social, political and economic dynamics behind 
processes of environmental reform currently being witnessed in China. Finally, the article draws 
some initial conclusions on the nature of ‘ecological modernization’ in China in an age marked by 
globalization, and thus on the geographical reach of ecological modernization theory. 
 
 
2. Ecological modernization as a European project 
 
It is far from easy to distill the core features of ecological modernization from the rapidly growing 
European environmental social sciences literature. There are various reasons for this. For one, 
being a rather young theory, the literature of ecological modernization is still very much in 
development with ‘competing’ and complementing interpretations. Second, scholars contributing 
to the literature on ecological modernization operate on various levels of abstractions. While 
some contribute to ecological modernization as a theory of social change, others focus on the 
changes in ideas and discourses or on the environmental policies being implemented. It goes 
without saying that these differences result in differences in emphasizing what is now exactly the 
main, basic or principle idea or set of ideas that lies at the foundation of ecological modernization. 
Third, and partly related to the former point, those contributing to the ecological modernization 
literature start from or apply a range of theoretical frames, among which systems theory, 
discourse analysis, institutional theory, structuration theory, and new social movement 
approaches. Consequently, when I try to summarize below the core features of ecological 
modernization ideas in especially Western Europe I look for the common denominators in this 
rich and growing literature, but it will be impossible not to give some interpretations pride of 
place above others. So the essence of ecological modernization put forward here is an 
interpretation of what I see as the more central, important and/or influential connotations in 
comparison with other contradictory or more peripheral versions. 
 
The central idea behind ecological modernization 
 
Several authors claim that the central idea of ecological modernization is the growing 
compatibility of environmental protection and economic growth (e.g. Hajer, 1995) or the idea that 
technology is the key to any modern project of environmental reform (Dryzek, 2000; Christoff, 
1996; Humphrey et al., 2002). Although without any doubt the first perspective emerges in 
numerous publications that deal with ecological modernization, and the second notion is 
prevailing widely in the more ambivalent or critical publications on ecological modernization, I 
think both miss the core, basic idea of ecological modernization. 
The basic premise of Ecological Modernization Theory is the centripetal movement of 
ecological interests, ideas and considerations in the social practices and institutional 
developments of modern societies. This results in ecology-inspired and environment-induced 
processes of transformation and reform of the core practices and central institutions of modern 
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society, a process that started to take place seriously from the 1980s onwards. This key idea can 
be found in all influential publications on ecological modernization, starting from Joseph Huber’s 
(1982) idea of the ecological switch-over as the new (Schumpeterian) phase in the maturation of 
the industrialization process, via Martin Jänicke’s (1993) notion of modernization of the political 
processes due to the growing importance of environmental interest and ideas, until more recent 
ideas of Spaargaren and van Vliet (2000) on the transformations in the infrastructures and 
practices of consumption, and the analyses of Murphy and Gouldson (2000) on industrial 
innovations. 
Within Ecological Modernization Theory these processes have been conceptualized at an 
analytical level as the growing autonomy, independence or ‘differentiation’ of an ecological 
perspective and ecological rationality vis-à-vis other perspectives and rationalities (cf. Mol, 1995; 
Spaargaren, 1997; Seippel, 2000; Andersen and Massa, 2000). In the domains of policies, politics 
and ideologies, the growing independence of an ecological perspective commenced in the 
seventies and early eighties in most of the West-European and North American societies. The 
construction of governmental organizations, departments, legal institutions and monitoring and 
reporting programs especially set up to deal with environmental issues dates from that era, 
followed later by the emergence of green parties in the political system of many OECD countries 
(cf. Carter, 2001). In the socio-cultural domain a distinct green ideology - as manifested by, for 
instance, environmental NGOs, environmental periodicals and 'green' belief systems - started to 
emerge in the 1970s or before. Especially in the 1980s this ideology assumed an independent 
status and could no longer be interpreted in terms of the old political ideologies of socialism, 
liberalism and conservatism (cf. Paehlke, 1989; Giddens, 1994). 
But the crucial transformation, which makes the notion of the growing autonomy of an 
ecological perspective and rationality especially relevant and led European scholars to the 
introduction of the concept of ecological modernization, is of more recent origin. It was only in 
the 1980s that in the economic domain, an ecological rationality and perspective started to 
challenge the monopoly of economic rationality as the all-determining organizing principle. And 
since, according to most scholars, the growing independence of an ecological rationality and 
perspective from their economic counterparts in the domain of production and consumption is 
crucial to ‘the ecological question’, this last step is the decisive one. It means that economic proc-
esses of production and consumption are increasingly analyzed and judged, as well as designed 
and organized from both an economic and an environmental point of view (be it of course not to a 
similar extent up till today). Some profound institutional changes in the economic domain of 
production and consumption have become discernible from the late 1980s onward in OECD 
countries. Among these changes are the widespread emergence of environmental management 
systems and departments of the environment in firms; the introduction of economic valuation of 
environmental goods via eco-taxes, among other things; the emergence of environment-inspired 
liability and insurance arrangements; the increasing importance attached to environmental goals 
such as natural resource saving and recycling among public and private utility enterprises, making 
it a key issue in competition; and the articulation of environmental considerations in economic 
supply and demand (for instance via eco-labeling schemes, environmental information and 
communication systems in economic chains).  
The fact that we analyze these environment-related transformations as institutional changes 
indicates their semi-permanent character. Although the process of environment-induced 
transformations and efficiencies should not be interpreted as linear and irreversible, as was 
commonly done in the modernization theories in the 1950s and 1960s, these changes have some 
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permanency and would be difficult to reverse. Hence, although environment moves up and down 
the "issue-attention cycle" of politics (Downs, 1966), it is strongly embedded in the core 
institutions and social practices of modern society, which strongly subdues any radical and 
sudden breakdown of environmental gains, even in times of economic stagnation. In the 
terminology of Giddens (1984), we speak of an episodic transformation: a specified direction of 
change over a delineated time period. 
 
Dynamics, mechanisms and actors in Europe 
 
Various ecological modernization scholars have elaborated on the social mechanisms, dynamics 
and actors through which social practices and institutions are transformed  by the incorporation of 
environmental interests and considerations. In European ecological modernization studies three 
categories regularly return: 
• Political modernization. The modern “environmental state” (Mol and Buttel, 2002) plays a 
key role in processes of environmental institutionalization, but does so no longer in a 
conventional way. First, there is a trend towards decentralized, flexible and consensual styles 
of national governance, at the expense of top-down, centralized, hierarchical, command-and-
control regulation. Second, we can witness a greater involvement of non-state actors in the 
conventional tasks of the nation-state (= the provision of public goods), including 
privatization, conflict resolution by business-environmental NGO coalitions, private interest 
government, and the emergence of “subpolitics” (Beck, 1994). Finally, there is an emerging 
role for international and supra-national institutions that to some extent undermine the 
sovereign role of the nation-state in environmental reform. Together with the next category 
this results in new state-market relations in environmental protection and reform. 
• Economic and market dynamics and economic agents gain in importance in environmental 
reform. While in the 1960s and 1970s environmental improvements were only triggered by the 
state and environmental NGOs, more recently producers, customers, consumers, credit 
institutions, insurance companies, the utility sector, and business associations increasingly turn 
into social carriers of ecological restructuring, innovation and reform (in addition to state 
agencies and new social movements), both within countries and across borders. They use 
market, monetary and economic logics in striving for environmental goals.  
• Civil society. With the institutionalization processes, new positions, roles, ideologies and 
cultural frames for environmental movements are crystallizing. Instead of positioning 
themselves on the periphery or even outside the central decision-making institutions, 
environmental movements seem increasingly involved in decision-making processes within 
the state and, to a lesser extent, the market (cf. Mol, 2000; Sonnenfeld, 2002). Environmental 
norms, values and discourses gain influence by spreading far beyond the professionals and 
core supporters of environmental NGOs, a process that is paralleled by their reformulation.  
 
From Europe to China 
 
In analyzing China's environmental reforms from an ecological modernization perspective, it is 
important to distinguish between on the one hand the leading idea of ecological modernization 
theory and on the other the dynamics and mechanism and actors at work in processes of 
ecological modernization. If ecological modernization is taking place in China, then there should 
be evidence of a growing 'differentiation' of an environmental rationality and perspective from its 
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economic counterparts, and a subsequent institutionalization of ecological interests, ideas and 
considerations in social practices and institutional developments. But the concrete dynamics, 
mechanisms and actors which are directing (or beginning to direct) this process in China can 
differ from what is witnessed or interpreted in Western Europe. It is especially with respect to the 
(European) processes introduced in the previous section of this paper that ecological 
modernization processes can differ from country to country and region to region, and that the 
notion of mode or style might be helpful. 
 
 
3. The development of the Chinese 'environmental state' 
 
In exploring ecological modernization and environmental reform in contemporary China it goes 
without saying that I will and have to be highly selective. The common opinion on China's 
environmental record seems to include poor performing of state agencies and deteriorating 
environmental quality, rather than anything like ecological modernization. While I think this is a 
too one-sided perspective, in searching for ecological modernization dynamics I will nevertheless 
have to be selective by focusing especially on the successes, improvements and changes-for-the 
better in China's environmental reform. Where do we see the seeds of environmental 
institutionalization? Which environmental reform dynamics seems to have good chances to 
become dominant because they are part of larger tendencies and transformations in China? What 
are the crucial actors and advocacy coalitions that might push ecological modernization? And on 
which points do these differ from what we have witnessed in European ecological modernization 
processes? I will start in this section with a short historic introduction on environmental reform in 
China and an assessment of the trends in environmental ‘additions’ and ‘withdrawals’ over the 
last decade. 
In a former command economy that is now in a transition stage one should not be too surprised 
to find environmental institutionalization primarily in state and political structures and 
institutions. The start of serious involvement of the Chinese government in environmental 
protection more or less coincides with the start of economic reforms in the late 1970s. Pollution 
control was initialized in the early 1970s, especially following the 1972 United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. In 1974 a National Environmental 
Protection Office was established, with equivalents in the provinces. But its major progress and 
maturation is achieved after the enactment and implementation of the environmental laws and 
regulations since the late 1970s, with especially an acceleration in the 1990s. Following the 
promulgation of the state Environmental Protection Law in 1979 (revised in 1989), China began 
to systematically establish her environmental regulatory system. In 1984 environmental protection 
was defined as a national basic policy and key principles for environmental protection in China 
were proposed, which include “prevention is the main, then control”, “polluter responsible for 
pollution control” (already introduced in the 1979 environmental law), and “strengthening 
environmental management”. Subsequently, a national regulatory framework was formulated, 
composed of a series of environmental laws (on all the major environmental segments, starting 
with marine protection and water in 1982 and 1984), executive regulations, standards and 
measures.2  
                                                 
2 At a national level China has now some 20 environmental laws adopted by the National People’s 
Congress, some 140 executive regulations issued by the State Council, and a series of sector regulations 
and environmental standards by the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). 
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Institutionally, the national regulatory framework is vertically implemented through a four-tier 
management system, i.e., national, provincial, municipal and county levels. The latter three levels 
are governed directly by their corresponding authorities in terms of both finance and personnel 
management, while the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) is only technically 
responsible for their operation. The enactment of the various environmental laws, instruments and 
regulations through the last two decades was paralleled by a stepwise increase of the bureaucratic 
status and capacity of these environmental authorities (Jahiel, 1998). For instance, the NEPA, was 
elevated via the National Environmental Protection Bureau to the National Environmental 
Protection Agency (in 1988), and in 1998 it received ministerial status as SEPA. By 1995, the 
“environmental state” had over 88,000 employees all over China and by 2000 it had grown to 
130,000.3 Jahiel (1998: 776) concludes on this environmental bureaucracy: “Clearly, the past 15 
years…has seen the assembly of an extensive institutional system nation-wide and the increase of 
its rank. With these gains has come a commensurate increase in EPB authority - particularly in the 
cities”. Although, the expansion of the 'environmental state' sometimes met stagnation (e.g. the 
set back of Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) in many counties from second-tier to third-
tier organs in 1993/1994), over a period of 20 years the growth in quantity and quality of the 
officials is impressive (especially when compared with the shrinking of other state bureaucracies). 
Besides SEPA, the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) and the State Economic and 
Trade Commission (SETC) are crucial national state agencies in environmental protection, 
especially since the recent governmental reorganization in 1998. 
Arguably, these administrative initiatives show initial results in environmental improvements, 
although the widespread information distortion, the discontinuities in environmental statistics and 
the absence of longitudinal environmental data in China should made us cautious in drawing any 
final conclusions.4 Total suspended particulates and sulfur dioxide concentrations show absolute 
decline in most major Chinese cities between the late 1980s and the late 1990s (Lo and Xing, 
1999; Rock, 2002), which is of course remarkable given the high economic growth figures during 
that decade. By the end of 2000 CFC production decreased 33% compared to mid 1990s levels, 
due to the close down of 30 companies (SEPA, 2001). It is reported (but also contested) that 
emissions of carbon dioxide have fallen between 1996 and 2000, under an ongoing economic 
growth (Slower and Fridley, 2001; Chandler et al., 2002).5 Most other environmental indicators 
show a delinking between environmental impacts and economic growth (e.g. water pollution in 
terms of biological oxygen demand; World Bank 1997). More indirect indicators that suggest 
similar relative improvements are the growth of China's environmental industry (increasing from 
0.22 per cent of GDP in 1989 via 0.87 per cent of GDP in 2000, to 1.1 per cent in 2002), the 
                                                 
3 In 2000 there were over 80,000 environmental staff at the county level (in more than 7,000 institutions), 
35,000 staff at the city level (in 1700 institutions) , almost 11,000 staff at the provincial level and some 
3,000 staff at the national level (together in some 300 institutions) (SEPA, 2001). 
4 The annual “Report on the State of the Environment in China” by SEPA usually contain data on 
emissions and environmental quality, but there is a major lack in consistency in data presentations between 
1997 and 2001  (see: www.zhb.gov.cn/english/SOE for de various annual national environmental reports 
and the related statistics). 
5 Slower and Fridley (2001) and Chandler (2002) report a decrease of 17% in greenhouse gas emissions 
(based on official Chinese energy statistics), the International Energy Agency estimates energy reduction to 
be 5-8% in that period, while the American Embassy in China claims a zero growths of energy use in China 
(www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/energy_stats_web.htm). All sources agree on the causes of delinking 
energy use/greenhouse gas emissions with economic growth: increased energy efficiency, economic 
reforms, and fuel switch from coal to natural gas. 
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increase of firms certified with ISO14000 standards during the turn of the millennium (Mol 
2001), and the closing of heavily polluting factories following especially environmental 
campaigns during the second half of the 1990s (cf. Nygard and Xiaomin, 2001). Needless to say 
that these positive signs should not distract us from the fact that China is heavily polluted, that 
emissions and environmental quality levels are often far above international standards, that only 
25% of the municipal wastewater is treated before discharge (although 85% of industrial 
wastewater according to SEPA data; SEPA 2001), and that environmental and resource 
efficiencies of production and consumption processes are overall rather low. 
 
 
4. Ecologizing China's modernization project 
 
In the birth period of environmental protection China’s environmental protection system showed 
characteristics similar to that of other centrally planned economies: limited citizen involvement; 
little response to international agreements, organizations and institutions; a strong focus on central 
state authority and especially the Communist Party of China (CPC) with restricted freedom of 
maneuver for both decentralized state organizations, para-statals and private organizations; an 
obsession with large scale technological developments (in terms of hard technology); problems 
with coordination between state authorities and departments, together with a limited 
empowerment of the environmental authorities (Cf. Ziegler, 1983; DeBardeleben, 1985; 
Lothspeich and Chen, 1997). The further construction, development and maturation of China's 
environmental reform strategy was not a linear process along this line, not a simple unfolding of 
the initial model of environmental governance invented twenty years ago under a command 
economy. Two main reasons are behind a certain degree of discontinuity in Chinese 
environmental reform. First, the economic, political and social changes that China witnessed and 
experienced during the last two decades also affected the original 'model' of environmental 
governance. Economic transformations towards a market oriented growth model, decentralization 
dynamics, growing openness to and integration in the outside world, and bureaucratic 
reorganization processes have shifted China’s environmental governance model away from those 
common to centrally planned economies. Second, China also witnessed the inefficiencies and 
ineffectiveness of its initial environmental governance approach, not unlike the ‘state failures’ 
(Jänicke, 1986) that European countries witnessed in the 1980s before they transformed their 
environmental protection approach along lines of ecological modernization. Building on all kinds 
of innovative experiments and developments resulting from such dynamics, environmental 
governance and the institutionalization of environmental ideas and interests in China have 
developed in unique ways during the last decade.  
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In analyzing the process of environmental institutionalization in China’s modernization path 
we have to bear in mind that we are trying to understand a moving target, quite unlike the more 
stable contemporary (environmental) institutions of European and other OECD countries. 
Consequently, any analysis will have to focus more on trends and significant developments than 
on the state-of-art. These trends and significant developments may be grouped in four major 
categories: political modernization, economic actors and market dynamics, institutions beyond 
state and market, and international integration. 
 
Political modernization 
 
The state apparatus in China is of significant and even dominating importance in environmental 
protection and reform. Both the nature of the contemporary Chinese social order and the 
characteristic of the environment as a public good will safeguard the crucial position of the state 
in environmental protection and reform for some time. Environmental interests are particularly 
articulated by the impressive rise of environmental protection bureaus at various governmental 
levels. Still, the most common complaints from Chinese and foreign environmental analysts 
focuses exactly on this system of (local) EPBs: on their poor environmental capacity (in 
qualitative and quantitative terms); on the dependency of the local EPBs on both the higher level 
EPBs and the local governments (that often have no interest in stringent environmental reform, 
but play a key role in financing the local EPBs); on the lack and distortion of (environmental) 
information; on the still low priority given to environmental criteria in assessing local 
governments; and on the poor (financial) incentives for both governments and private actors to 
live up to environmental laws, standards and policies. 
But clearly the environmental state in China is undergoing a process of political 
modernization, where traditional hierarchical lines and conventional divisions of power are 
transformed. Although processes of political modernization in China's environmental policy have 
different characteristics from what can be witnessed in European countries, the direction of those 
reforms is nevertheless similar: greater decentralization and flexibility and moving away from a 
rigid, hierarchical, command-and-control system of environmental governance. Increasingly local 
EPBs and local governments are given - and taking – larger degrees of freedom in developing 
environmental priorities, strategies, financial models and institutional arrangements. This parallels 
on the one side broader tendencies of decentralization in Chinese society, and is on the other side 
also environmentally motivated by state failure in environmental policy.6 The tendency is 
definitely one towards larger influence and decision-making power by the local authorities and 
diminishing control by Beijing, both by the central state structures and by the CPC (see for 
instance on decentralization in energy policy Andrews-Speed et al., 1999).7 Decentralization and 
more flexibility contribute to environmental policies that are better adopted to the local physical 
and socio-economic situations. But also in China decentralization does not automatically result in 
a better protection of the environment (cf. Beach, 2001), as more than incidentally local 
                                                 
6 In developing their local policies and programs provincial or municipal governments need to be consistent 
with the national regulations. The tendency is that increasingly regulations and measures of sub-national 
governments develop their own dynamics, speed and partly contents, thus deviating at least temporarily 
from national regulations, but sometimes even substantially.  
7 As Ma and Ortolano (2000; 14) put it: “The Party has deeply penetrated the apparatuses of the state, and 
thus there is no advantage in distinguishing the Party from the state in our analysis of environmental 
policy”. This is too a major extent also valid for our analysis here. 
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authorities give preference to economic growth and investments above progressive development 
of environmental policies and stringent enforcement of environmental regulation and standards.8 
Especially when an active civil society and accountability mechanisms are poorly developed, 
decentralization has little to offer to the environment. But a larger degree of freedom for local 
authorities does results, for better or for worse, in a growing diversity among the Chinese 
provinces and towns in how local and regional environmental challenges are being dealt with. It 
also leads to a diversification of successes and failures among towns. These successes and failures 
are not only divided along lines of economic prosperity, where the richer eastern provinces and 
towns are systematically more concerned with and investing in environmental reform. Also within 
the eastern part of China differences in environmental prioritization can be found, as was shown 
by a detailed case study on environmental reforms in 5 towns in Anhui and Jiangsu provinces 
(Zhang, 2002). 
As in other countries, decentralization tendencies in China call for counter tendencies. 
Environmental protection projects, for instance, are increasingly financed centrally. The central 
state has also responded to this growing relative autonomy of local authorities by refining their 
system of evaluating towns and town governments. Mike Rock (2002b) provides a detailed 
analysis on how local governments are increasingly assessed with respect to their environmental 
performance by using the Urban Environmental Quality Examination System. The ranking on this 
system of environmental indicators does not only enable SEPA to compare municipalities. The 
indicator system also enables governments to design environmental responsibility contracts with 
local leaders on improvements in individual indicators, and link these to assessments, financial 
incentives and promotion, providing an incentive for town and village leaders to take 
environmental protection more seriously. This of course trickles down to the officials of, for 
instance, economic and planning departments of villages. It is a system of making local 
environmental governance accountable to the higher levels, in a situation where decentralized, 
civil society based, systems of accountability are underdeveloped. Via such mechanisms 
environmental rationalities are brought into the political system, where local leaders are no longer 
only judged according to political and economic criteria, but also according to environmental 
results. 
Another political modernization tendency is the separation between state owned enterprises 
(SOE) and the line ministries and local governments (in case of TVEs) that were originally 
responsible for them.9 There is a slow but steady process of transferring decision-making on 
production units from the political and party influence to the economic domains, where logics of 
markets and profits are dominant.10 Although especially at the local level governments are not 
                                                 
8 Chen and Porter (2000: 59) conclude the same for decentralization in energy conservation policies: “ It is 
clear that the ongoing process of change in organizational structures and lines of responsibility has given 
rise to much confusion in recent years, and if anthing has undermined rather than improved the prospects 
for a coordinated and enforceable policy for energy conservation in industry” 
9 From research on steel enterprises Fisher-Vanden (2003) reports that within Chinese state-owned 
enterprises decentralization in firm management improves the incorporation of new and more energy and 
environmental efficient technology. 
10 By the end of the 1990s many state owned enterprises have full decision power on production, sales, 
purchasing and investments. But in most cases relations between these enterprises and state authorities are 
still intricate and local agencies still succeed in extracting funds from profitable enterprises for public 
works or other purposes, in subsidizing inefficient enterprises and in influencing decisions at enterprises. 
This is also valid in the case of TVIEs, as Zhang (2002) has shown for counties in Anhui and Jiangsu 
provinces. 
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always eager to give up direct relations with successful enterprises because of the financial 
resources linked to that, the tendency of growing autonomy of enterprises from political agents is 
unmistaken. This process of differentiation opens, among others, opportunities for more stringent 
environmental control and enforcement as the 'protection' of these SOE by line ministries and 
bureaus at all government levels is less direct. It also sets preferential conditions for a stronger 
rule of - environmental - law (see below). But it does not solve one of the key problems of 
environmental governance: the low priority given to environmental state organizations vis-à-vis 
their economic and other counterparts. The progress in the strengthening and empowering of 
China’s environmental state is ambivalent, as is common elsewhere around the world. While, - as 
illustrated above - the central environmental authority in Beijing has strengthened its position vis-
à-vis other ministries and agencies, this is not always the case at the local level where more than 
incidentally the EPBs are part of - and thus subsumed to - an economic state organization (see 
Zhang, 2002 and Vermeer, 1998, for examples).11 And also at the central level interdepartmental 
struggles do not always result in favorable environmental positions and often continue a 
fragmented environmental authority (Lo and Xing, 1999: 165; Jahiel, 1998). For instance, the 
State Economic and Trade Commission SETC is the primary responsible party for the new 2002 
Cleaner Production Promotion Law, and not SEPA. The former is also responsible for energy 
conservation policy (Chen and Porter, 2000). And the Ministry of Science and Technology won 
the battle over the coordination of China's Agenda 21 program from SEPA, despite heavy 
influence and lobbying from UNDP (Buen, 2000).12 
Finally, the emergence of the rule of law and can be identified as a modernization in 
environmental politics, closely tied to the emergence of a market economy. The system of 
environmental laws established from the 1980s onwards has led to the setting of improved 
standards for environmental quality and emission discharges and the establishment of a legal 
framework for various implementation programs.13 But usually the environmental programs 
themselves, the administrative decisions related to the  implementation of standards and the 
bargaining between administrations and polluters on targets have been more influential for 
environmental reform than the laws and regulations per se. Being in conflict with the law is 
usually still less problematic than being in conflict with administrations and programs, and most 
of the massive clean-up programs were not so much derived from environmental laws (although 
they were not in conflict with them), but rather based on administrative decisions at the top.14 The 
                                                 
11 In the past EPBs relied sometimes heavily on the environmental protection divisions of industrial bureaus 
or ministries, as these had usually good access to and knowledge of the polluters, especially in the situation 
when state and markets agents were hardly separated. More recently, the involvement of the industrial 
bureaus (or general companies as they are sometimes renamed) in environmental protection has been 
diminished. While on the longer term this is considered to be a favorable development, in specific cases 
and on the short term this has caused EPBs with serious problems due to lacking environmental and 
technological capacity. 
12 The SETC replaces the industrial line ministries and is indeed much more powerful than the SEPA 
(which is also suggested by being named Commission). SETC has several environmental tasks and 
organizations independent from SEPA, such as monitoring stations. 
13 The major eight national environmental programs are: environmental impact assessment; three 
synchronizations; pollution discharge fee system; pollution control with deadlines; discharge permit 
system; assessment of urban environmental quality; centralized control of pollution and environmental 
responsibility system. The first three date from the late 1970s, the last three were implemented later to 
manage problems the first three could not handle (see for further details Ma and Ortolano, 2000: 20ff)  
14 Most sinologists that aim to understand state environmental protection system pay indeed only marginal 
attention to environmental laws and the enforcements of environmental laws, and rather concentrate on 
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same is true for enforcement of national environmental laws at the local level. The rather vague 
laws are interpreted in very different ways by EPBs, often under strong administrative influence 
of the local mayor’s office (cf. Ma and Ortolano, 2000: 63). Courts have been marginally 
involved in enforcement and EPBs use courts only as a last resort to enforce environmental laws 
that polluters refuse to adhere to (Jahiel, 1998: 764). More recently there are signs that the rule of 
law is taken more seriously in the field of environment, paralleled by, among others, stronger 
(financial) punishments and legal procedures started by for instance environmental NGOS such as 
the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV) in Beijing.15 One of the potential 
threats to the environment is of course the institutional void that can emerge when the 
administrative system loses its power on environmental protection, while the rule of law has 
hardly been institutionalized in the field of environment. 
 
Economic actors and market dynamics 
 
Traditionally, centrally planned economies did a poor job in setting the right price signals for a 
sustainable use of natural resources and a minimization of environmental pollution, 
notwithstanding the theoretical advantages and the early ideas of some progressive economists 
and other environmental scholars in these command economies (cf. DeBardeleben, 1985; Mol and 
Opschoor, 1990). With a cautious turn to a market oriented growth model since 1978 one would 
expect to find some first economic and market dynamics pushing for environmental reform. In 
contemporary China, as well, environmental interests are being slowly institutionalized in the 
economic domain of prices, markets, and competition. 
First, subsidies on natural resource prices are increasingly abandoned and prices for natural 
resources tend to move to cost prices, sometimes pressed through foreign loans.16 This is up till 
now of course a relative improvement, as the cost prices hardly ever include costs for repair of 
damage and environmental externalities (and we know from the major flooding due to forest cuts 
that these externalities can by quite dramatic, also in monetary terms).17  
Secondly, clear attempts are made to increase environmental fees and tax reductions18, so that 
they do influence (economic) decision-making of polluters. Especially the discharge fees, 
introduced already in the 1980s, have become more and more common practice, also because 
these are an important source of income for local EPBs and a significant trigger for 
implementation of environmental measures.19 Fees are often only paid for discharging above the 
                                                                                                                                                 
administrative measures and campaigns (cf. Vermeer, 1998; Jahiel, 1998) 
15 Interview with the director of CLAPV, Wang Canfa, 2001. See also Ho (2001: 908) and Otsuka (2002). 
16 An example is the early 1990s World Bank loan to replace the thousands of small coal burning boilers in 
Beijing for more energy efficient and less polluting heating systems. The World Bank's condition was that 
the Beijing heating Power Corporation became an independent business body operating under market 
conditions and that subsidies were removed from energy prices. This has indeed been done (Gan, 2000). 
17 In 1996 it costs 0.843 yuan to supply a ton of water, while the average price of water in Hebei province 
was 0.6-0.9 yuan/ton, 0.637 yuan in Beijing and only 0.013 yuan in Hetao region (Lo and Xing, 1999: 159). 
18 Tax reductions are sometimes offered if environmental goals are reached, such as in the case of energy 
saving in steel plants and other heavy energy consuming industries (cf. Chen and Porter, 2000). 
19 The fee program started in 1979 in some locations but gained more widespread use after 1982 and 
especially after the legal strengthening in 1989 in the final version of the Environmental Protection Law. 
The majority of the fees are collected for water and air emissions (see SEPA, 2001). Only part of the fee 
can be used by the local EPBs to finance their staff, equipment and programs. The other part goes back into 
environmental funds that are used to subsidize environmental measures of industries. While hundreds of 
thousand of firms have paid a fee, especially the small and rural industries have managed to escape 
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standard. Notwithstanding the rhetoric of ‘pollution prevention pays’ and ‘cleaner production’ 
that have entered modern china since the 1990s fees20 are still so low and monitoring is so weak 
that enterprises risk to either pay the fee or neglect payment, rather than installing environmental 
protection equipment or changing production processes, (cf. Taylor and Qingshu, 2000 for the 
city of Wuhan). The introduction of higher fees is by no means a smooth process. Already in 1992 
NEPA proposed an increase of 0.20 yuan per kg of discharged sulfur dioxide following coal 
burning (an increase of less than 1%), to cover at least part of the environmental costs of 
desulfurization.21 Implementation was postponed first to 1996 and then only introduced as a pilot 
program, which was - in an extended version - still the situation in 2000. 
Third, market demand starts to take environmental and health dimensions of products and 
production processes into account, especially in international markets that have increased so 
dramatically in the trail of China's accession to the WTO. Already in 1990 the import of Chinese 
refrigerators to the EU was restricted due to the use of CFC as a cooling agent (Vermeer, 1998), 
but that was still an exception. Today, these kinds of international (especially European, North 
American, and Japanese) market trends towards greener products and production processes are 
felt in many more product categories, pushing for instance to higher levels of ISO certification, 
and growing interest for cleaner production, eco-labeling systems and industrial ecology 
initiatives (cf. Shi, 2003; Shi et al., 2003). Like most developing economies, the Chinese domestic 
market still poorly articulates environmental interests, and green  or healthy labeling is 
underdeveloped. 
Although, economic reforms have resulted in a decreasing role of the central state in economic 
decision-making and a growing autonomy of economic and market actors (with a few exceptions 
described above), this has not yet resulted in more non-state actors that articulate environmental 
interests.22 Insurance companies, banks, public utility companies, business associations, general 
corporations and others do not yet play any significant role in environmental reforms. The main 
reason of course is that these economic actors do not yet feel any direct or indirect pressure or 
market opportunity for institutionalizing environmental interests in their arrangements and daily 
routines. The three major exceptions to this are: large Chinese firms that operate on an 
international market, the environmental industry and R&D institutions. 
• The larger Chinese and joint venture firms that operate for and in a global market articulate 
stringent environmental standards and practices, but also try to pass these new standards and 
practices onto their customers and state organizations, pushing the domestic level playing 
field towards international levels. The Chinese petrochemical company Petrochina, for 
instance, is investing in several countries nowadays and has joint venture operations in China 
                                                                                                                                                 
payment due to lack of enforcement. Wang and Wheeler (1999) found that the levies are higher in heavily 
polluted and economically developed areas and that they do influence air and water emission reductions 
within companies. 
20 Ma and Ortolano (2000: 21) refer to four penalty charges (the so called four small pieces) that have to be 
paid above the discharge fee. 
21 “Notification on Implementation of Pilot program of levy on Industrial Sulfur Dioxide Pollution by Coal 
Burning”. State Council Letter (1996#24) agreed on the pilot implementation via SEPA’s “Report on Pilot 
Program of Sulfur Dioxide Discharge Fee”.  
22 Although finance bureaus and local banks sometimes still play a role in administrating environmental 
funds that are filled with the pollution discharge fees and decide on loans or grants to polluters, these 
economic agents do not really play a role in articulating themselves environmental interests in their 
economic activities. Local banks are not really eager to lend additional money to polluters for 
environmental investments, according to a World Bank study (Spofford et al. 1996, as quoted in Ma and 
 14
with several western oil multinationals. It strongly feels the need to acquire international 
recognized environmental management knowledge, standards and emission levels, allowing it 
to compete on a global market. In acquiring these practices, it also brings home to the Chinese 
state these standards with a call for upward harmonization among all players in the Chinese 
petrochemical sector.23  
• The expanding environmental industry (see above) becomes an actor that presses for the 
greening of production and consumption processes, as it has a clear interest in growing 
environmental regulation and reform (cf. Sun, 2001).24 Also foreign environment industries 
and consultancies increasingly enter the Chinese market, partly financed by ODA projects. 
• Research and development institutions, from the ones related to universities to those related to 
the line ministries and bureaus, are increasingly focusing their attention to environmental 
externalities, and articulate environmental interest among decision-making institutions both 
within the economic and the political domain. In universities a growing number of 
environmental departments, centers and curricula have been established in the 1990s. 
 
Beyond state and market: civil society 
 
Similar to European countries, environmental reforms in China have not been limited to 
institutional changes of state and market. In European countries the environmental movement, 
environmental periodicals and the foundation of a more and more universal system of 
environmental norms and values are both medium and outcome of processes of ecological 
modernization in what has become known as civil society. In China the incorporation of 
environmental interest in institutions and arrangements beyond state and market has followed a 
completely different trajectory. 
China has a very recent history of environmental NGOs and other social organizations that 
articulate environmental interests and ideas of civil society and press them among the political 
and economic decision-makers (cf. Qing and Vermeer, 1999; Ho, 2001; the contribution of 
Martens to this special issue). Environmental NGOs are limited in number, they are often not 
adversarial or confrontational but rather expert or awareness-raising organizations, such as Global 
Village. The ‘political room’ for a western-style environmental movement seems still limited, as 
also international NGOs have witnessed. International NGOs such as Greenpeace and WWF have 
invested major efforts in further stimulating the environmental movement in China, with 
ambiguous successes. While in some of the Central and East European centrally planned 
economies environmental NGOs played a role in articulating environmental and other protests 
against the ruling social order, in China environmental NGOs have been marginal up till now in 
pushing for the ecological modernization of the Chinese economy. For civil society’s contribution 
to environmental reform three other arrangements are important: the rise of environmentally-
oriented government-organized NGOs (GONGOs); increasing local activism and complaints; and 
the importance of unwritten social norms, rules and codes of conduct.  
Government-Organized NGOs, such as the Beijing Environmental Protection Organization 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ortolano, 2000). 
23 Interview Petrochina, environmental monitoring office, December 2001. 
24 In analyzing the growing role of Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations in 
environmental reforms Wu (2002) mentions two major and influential environmental industry associations: 
the China Environment Protection Industry Association and the China Renewable Energy Industry 
Association. 
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and China Environment Fund, are playing an increasingly important role in environmental 
governance in China today. They have more freedom of registration and maneuver due to their 
close links with state agencies. Via closed networks with policy-makers and their expert 
knowledge these GONGOs articulate environmental interests and bring them into state and 
market institutions. In doing so GONGOs play a role in bridging the gap between NGOs and civil 
society on the one hand and the state on the other, thus “becoming an important, non-state arena 
for China’s environmental politics” (Wu, 2002: 48).25 Now that these GONGOs are gaining 
organizational, financial and political independency and autonomy from the state, they are 
evaluated more positively by Western scholars. Although they remain embedded in a dominating 
state structure, the state is relaxing its control and allowing them relative autonomy in developing 
activities and raising funds.  
Together with economic liberalization, decentralization of decision-making and experiments 
with local democratization one can witness a growing pressure of - often unorganized - citizens on 
local (environmental) authorities to reduce environmental pollution. Dasgupta and Wheeler 
(1996) estimated that local and provincial authorities respond to over 130,000 complaints 
annually in the period 1991-1993. In most of the cities and towns systems of complaints and 
hotlines have been installed, be it with different levels of use and effect. In Wuhan (a city of 
almost 7 million) the local EPB received 680 complaints in 1994, resulting in 658 visits (Taylor 
and Qingshu, 2000), in 1998 Wujin EPB (1.2 million, Jiangsu province) responded to 479 
complaints, while a deadly polluted small town as Digang (50,000 inhabitants, Anhui province) 
reported that they received not one complaint in 1998 (data by Zhang, 2002).26 In China, these 
systems of complaints and the growing attention the (state-owned and controlled) media pays to 
environmental pollution and environmental mismanagement are more important than NGOs in 
articulating civil society's environmental interests towards economic and political decision-
makers. One should be aware that these dynamics drive on the growing commitment of the CPC 
and the central government to combat pollution, and more than incidentally the central 
government has strongly encouraged the media and individuals to speak up on environmental 
misuse. In that sense, the dominant environmental discourse and the advocacy coalitions 
supporting that discourse have changed dramatically during the last 15 years. But still, this system 
of complaints is a poor form of ‘participation’ of civil society in environmental issues. It focuses 
only on (sensible) monitoring after pollution has happened, in a time where the ‘expropriation of 
the senses’ needs a preventive and precautionary approach. More systematic involvement of 
citizens and civil society in the stage of project development with full access to information is 
missing.  
Thirdly, in Chinese society informal social norms, rules and unwritten codes of conduct play 
an important role in structuring human action. These rules are strongly anchored in Chinese civil 
society, rather than in the formal institutions of state and market and may play an important role 
in environmental reform. Ma and Ortolano (2000: 77ff) mention three major non-formal rules: 
                                                 
25 Wu (2002) gives a detailed analysis of the emergence of a diversity of GONGOs (among which 
foundations, education centers, research institutions, and industry associations) within the national and 
provincial administrative bodies, and the role they are able to play due to their less restrictive institutional 
structure, their expertise and personal connections. Wu also shows the clear reasons for the Chinese 
government to allow or create GONGOs, among which attracting foreign assistance and funding. 
26 Dasgupta and Wheeler (1997) show that the average number of environmental complaints of major cities 
and provinces in one year range from 55.0 per 100,000 inhabitants in Shanghai to 1.7 per 100,000 
inhabitants for Gansu. In most provinces EPBs responded to over 80% of these (telephone, letter and face-
to-face) complaints. 
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respect for authority and status even if it conflicts with the formal institutions; the social 
connections or guanxi that play a major role in organizing social life in China; and the moral 
authority and social capital that is included in the concept of (losing, maintaining or gaining) 
‘face’. With the growing importance attached to environmental protection, these and other 
‘informal’ rules and institutions are put to work for environmental goals and rationalities. Guanxi 
and ‘face’ play a role in environmental protection, where informal networks of social relations are 
formed around environmental programs and dispute resolutions, and social capital is built via 
environmental awards, prices, and media coverage. While some of these institutions are not 
unknown in Europe (be it often differently organized), they have a much larger influence in China 
and are consequently more important in environmental reforms. If we are to understand 
ecological modernization dynamics in China we have to understand how and to what extent these 
informal institutions, networks, and connections articulate environmental rationalities via for 
instance the inclusion of environmental norms in social capital and moral authority and the 
increase of the status of environmental authorities. These dynamics are of course not working in 
the same way and equally strong in every corner of China. 
One of the shortcomings that prevents a larger role for civil society - and other institutions 
beyond state and market - in environmental reform is its limited environmental information due 
to: 
• scarce environmental monitoring (most environmental monitoring needs to be funded by the 
local governments, who have limited budgets) and distortion in information processing; 
• secrecy of environmental data for large segments of society; 
• absence of a right-to-know code, legislation or practice; 
• limited publication and availability of non-secret data (due to poor reporting, limited internet 
use and access). 
Often only general and aggregate data are available only for political decision-makers and 
scientists, while specific local data are lacking or kept secret for those directly involved in 
environmental pollution. Consequently, local EPBs rely strongly on complaints as monitoring 
data, and priorities for control and enforcement are more than incidentally set accordingly. 
In their analysis of accountability of Chinese environmental authorities Wu and Robbins 
(2000a+b) show that also with a lacking active civil society and a shortage of reliable and 
transparent data China's environmental governance faces accountability questions. State agencies 
at other levels and other sectors, the media, scientists and international monitoring by MEA 
(Multilateral Environmental Agreement) organizations and donors do regularly hold 
environmental authorities accountable. 
 
International integration 
 
In assessing the role of external international forces on China's turn to environmental protection 
Rock (2002a: 82) is straightforward: "...there is no evidence of Chinese pollution management 
policies being affected by either international economic or political pressure. Instead, the Chinese 
government's pollution management programs have largely been influenced by internal 
developments, particularly the partial liberalization of its economy that started in 1979 and the 
decentralization of decision-making that accompanied it". Compared to the sometimes significant 
influence of foreign pressure and assistance on national environmental policy in other Asian 
countries, China has indeed been reluctant to accept assistance under stringent environmental 
conditions. The Three Gorges Dam is a clear example in this, where China ignored both foreign 
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pressure against the dam and threats of withholding international loans for this project. And also 
in international negotiations on MEAs, Chinese authorities are often hesitant to support stringent 
environmental policies that could rebound on domestic efforts (cf. Johnston, 1998; McElroy, 
1998; Chen and Porter, 2000). 
On less controversial issues foreign assistance programs have had a clear contribution to and 
influence on China's environmental policies and programs, however. Between 1991 and 1995 
US$ 1.2 billion foreign capital was invested in environmental protection in China (Vermeer, 
1998: 953). More recently, China has become an object of considerable international attention as 
well as environmental funding, via several MEAs and multilateral institutions such as the World 
Bank, GEF, ADB (cf. Huq et al., 1999) and UNEP. By the end of the 1990s the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank together provided US$ 800 million on environmental loans in 
China  annually. Asuka-Zhang (1999) illustrates the significance of bilateral environmental 
official development assistance (ODA) and environmental technology transfer to China, taking 
Japan as an example. It is estimated that around 15% of China’s total environment-related 
spending originates from bi- and multilateral lending and aid (Tremayne and De Waal, 1998). For 
instance, foreign projects have had a significant influence on the development and introduction of 
cleaner production, resulting finally in the 2002 Cleaner Production Promotion Law (Shi, 2003a). 
In drafting environmental laws nowadays participation of foreign lawyers, scientists, and other 
experts is standard practice. The phase-out of CFC use following the Montreal protocol has been 
another example. Directly after the Montreal protocol negotiations (1987) China increased its 
CFC production (by some 100% between 1986 and 1994; Held et al., 1999: 397), becoming the 
world leader in CFC production and consumption in 1996. It stabilized its production in the mid 
1990s onward and moved to a decline in consumption (from the mid 1990s onward) and 
production (in 2000), in response to international aid and potential trade bans by triad countries.27  
The recent growing openness to and integration in the global economy and polity will only 
increase international influence on China's domestic environmental reform.28 For instance, its 
membership of WTO will enhance the importance of the ISO standards in international but 
increasingly also domestic business interactions. And it will make China more vulnerable to 
international criticism on its domestic environmental performance. But international integration 
will also parallel China’s growing role in setting the agenda and influencing the outcomes of 
international negotiations and agreements, among which those relevant for the environment.  
 
 
5. Conclusion: a Chinese path of ecological modernization in-the-making? 
 
Especially since the early 1990s we can witness developments in China in restructuring processes 
and practices of production by giving environmental interests and conditions a higher priority. 
The first activities of the Chinese state to widen the original project of simple, technological 
modernization by giving environmental externalities more considerations date from the late 1970s 
and parallel the start of economic reform. Since then, state-driven environmental laws and 
programs have made a more serious impact, especially during the 1990s. China’s strategy and 
                                                 
27 Data by the Ozone secretariat of UNEP: www.unep.org/ozone 
28 There is still considerable debate, also within China, whether the accession to the WTO will force a 
further separation between politics and economics, with (beneficial) consequences such as an increase in 
transparency in policy-making, a growing pressure to implement the rule of law and a further undermining 
of the structural basis of corruption (cf. Fewsmith, 2001).  
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approach to tackle the growing environmental side-effects of modernization is far from stable and 
still developing and transforming, together with the general transition of China’s economy and 
state. But most environmental reform initiatives are firmly based on, make use of and take place 
within the boundaries of China’s modernization process. In that sense, using the denominator 
ecological modernization for China’s attempts to restructure it economy along ecological lines 
seems justified. 
But here the story doesn’t end, as can be concluded from the analysis above. The claim of a 
western version of ecological modernization theory seamlessly fitting current advancements in 
greening China’s economy and society needs to be further weighed and qualified along three 
major and interdependent lines: 
• the degree of institutionalization of environmental interests; 
• the respective roles of state, market and civil society in China’s ‘ecological modernization’; 
• the Chinese characteristics of environmental reform dynamics 
First, in its relatively short history most contributions to ecological modernization theory 
claim processes of institutionalizing environmental interests in social practices and institutional 
developments, reflexively reorienting the institutions of simple modernity along ecological 
criteria. While the analysis in this article gives sufficient evidence of a growing importance of 
environmental interest in the modernization processes, it also made clear that up till now 
environmental interests have been institutionalized partially, at best. There is no routine-like, 
automatic and full inclusion of environmental considerations in the institutions that govern 
production and consumption practices in contemporary China.  
Second, and partly linked to the former point, the institutions that take up environmental 
interests and ecologically restructure the Chinese economy deviate strongly from what scholars 
have identified in European societies. Only with respect to several political and state institutions 
environmental considerations and interest seem increasingly incorporated in the standard 
operating procedures and social practices, not too much unlike what ecological modernization 
scholars have identified in Europe. A large environmental state; a system of environmental laws, 
regulations and standards; the emergence of the rule of law; assessment systems of environmental 
performance; flexibilization and decentralization in environmental policy give evidence of that. 
But with respect to both economic and market institutions, and civil society the Chinese situation 
differs dramatically from Europe.  
 Where the introduction of the market economy liberalizes prices, increases efficiencies, takes 
away subsidies and strengthens international economic relations, economic institutions can 
advance ecological reforms. The abandoning of subsidies on natural resources such as energy and 
the international market demand for environmental conditions on Chinese products and processes 
are clear examples. But more often environmental reforms do not automatically coincide with 
economic (efficiency interests and then economic and market institutions play hardly any role in 
advancing environmental interests. There are several reasons for the poor articulation of 
environmental interests in, for instance, price settings, consumer and customer demand, insurance 
arrangements, credit facilities, public utility performance, economic competition, enterprise R&D 
programs and niche market developments in China. For one, environmental interests have not 
been articulated very strongly throughout the nation to put the emerging economic and market 
actors and institutions under pressure to include environmental considerations. In addition, in 
large parts of China economic institutions and actors have still intricate relations with and are 
dependent on political ones. This makes economic actors and institutions less free to incorporate 
environmental (and other new non-economic) interests in their routine operations. Finally, where 
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economic institutions and arrangements differentiate or ‘emancipate’ from political control they 
often develop into new, virgin, and single-goal institutions that are unable and unwilling to take 
up such ‘additional’ tasks as environmental protection. Arguably, jungle capitalism in its purest 
form can more often be found in certain parts of transitional China than in the welfare states of 
capitalist Europe. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to ‘civil society’ institutions and actors. 
Economic liberalization and market reform have not been paralleled yet with equal political 
liberalization and democratic reform. Consequently, civil society in China has been unable to play 
a role similar to civil society in most OECD countries: e.g. setting the environmental agenda, 
pressing economic and political institutions to include environmental interest, and fighting itself 
towards the center of political and economic decision-making. While China has developed its 
own institutions beyond state and market (e.g. GONGOs, cultural institutions, mass 
organizations), the role of these institutions in environmental reform is by no means equal to what 
we have witnessed in Europe. 
Third and finally, if we focus more in depth and precise on the mechanisms, processes and 
dynamics that trigger environmental reform and push for institutionalization, there are clear 
similarities but also differences of what we read from the European literature on ecological 
modernization. GONGOs, environmental responsibility contract system, policy principles such as 
three simultaneous, the strong role of informal networks, rules and institutions, and the dual 
responsibility of local EPBs are all arrangements that play a (major) role in the greening path of 
the contemporary Chinese economy, but have no equivalent in most European states. On the other 
hand European scholars in ecological modernization are familiar with protesting local 
communities, the emergence of an ‘environmental state’, globalization dynamics that push 
towards a level playing field on environmental protection, economic instruments such as the 
discharge fee system, a growing environmental industry and a reorientation of state R&D to 
environment, and decentralization and flexibilization in environmental policy. 
In sum, ecological modernization in-the-making in China can be said to be of a different 
mode than the European version that has been studied so widely. And it is also far from stabilized. 
Especially now that China is in transition and is opening up to the world polity and economy, the 
balance between commonalities and uniqueness in environmental reform may be increasingly 
uncertain. If the modernization path of China continues with a further ‘differentiation’ of 
economic institutions and arrangements from their political counterparts (and all signs point in 
that direction), it is essential that economic institutions and arrangements will increase their role 
in environmental reform. Ecological modernization studies have shown that - at least in Western 
countries - these economic institutions can play a major role in articulating, communicating, 
strengthening, institutionalizing and extending (in time and place) environmental reforms by 
means of their own (market and monetary) ‘language’, logic and rationality and their own ‘force’. 
However, economic institutions can and will only play that role if they are put under pressure, by 
the environmental state, by international institutions and/or by civil society. The future, character 
and uniqueness of China’s ecological modernization will especially depend on what will happen 
with this latter category. 
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